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THE FUTURE OF SDI
Paul Simon*
INTRODUCTION
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
which I oppose.
As in so many other things, the public has grasped the obvious, and that is
why the negative phrase "Star Wars" has stuck (much to President Ronald
Reagan's chagrin): neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can afford to
let the other side get the upper hand militarily. If our lasers go up into space,
theirs will soon follow. It will truly be Star Wars on a terrible scale.
In 1983, President Reagan invited the American people to glimpse the future.
The President's vision of a total defense was enthralling and hopeful. He bid us
to walk with him straight into a brave new world of futuristic space shields, a
world where Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles were made "impotent and obsolete."
He asked for a down payment of twenty-six billion dollars over a five year
period. After that money had been spent, his successors and the Congresses of
the 1990's would sift through the facts and make an informed decision.
In theory, there is nothing objectionable to spending scarce resources on
new ways to improve our nation's security. We routinely do this. The Constitution
says that Congress shall provide for the common defense, and that has come to
include a hefty annual sum for defense research and development.
But not every idea that comes down the pike makes sense politically or
militarily, even if there is a glimmer of technical optimism. And SDI just does
not make sense as presently constituted.
I support a research program on antimissile technologies. Almost everyone
in Congress does. But a limited, prudent, research-only program consistent with
the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 is one thing; SDI is a crash
program to build and deploy a questionable system of dubious merit. As Attorney
General Edwin Meese has said, the Reagan Administration wants to "lock in"
future Presidents and congressmen to its own particular SDI program.
The U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff is cause for great concern, but SDI is the
wrong way to go. The program is more likely to fuel the arms race than control
it. For the forseeable future, political solutions involving negotiations will build
a safer world-not orbiting space shields armed with lasers and particle beams.
Each side has acquired approximately 25,000 nuclear warheads. We are
locked in a stalemate. That stalemate is sometimes called "mutual assured
destruction," or MAD. Both sides are deterred from striking the other because
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devastating retaliation would follow. This is the basic condition of life in the
nuclear age.
For over forty years the world has lived with the terrible destructive power
of nuclear weaponry. Our best scientists and engineers, our military commanders
and civilian strategists, tell us that nuclear weapons are of a completely different
nature than conventional weapons.
Unfortunately, too many people continue to think of nuclear weapons as if
they were only slightly different from the bombs we dropped during World War
II-more powerful, perhaps, but really not that different. Too many national
security officials believe that nuclear warfare is practical. A few even believe that
victory is possible.
But Hiroshima was destroyed by a single nuclear bomb with a yield of just
thirteen kilotons (the blast of which is equal to 13,000 tons of TNT). An entire
city wiped off the face of the earth by a single blast. Today's weapons are many
times as destructive, and there are 50,000 such weapons around the globe. Nuclear
weapons, especially today's multi-megaton devices, are so potent that a mere
handful can effectively destroy the northern hemisphere in a matter of hours.
EXPLODING SOME SDI MYTHS
The Invincibility Myth
Let me take on some of the myths about SDI.
The first is that we can, in the words of former Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger, erect a "thoroughly reliable defense."
It does not matter how good our technology becomes. There has never been
a defense that has proven foolproof or leakproof, and there is no prospect that
such a defense can be erected. SDI does not contemplate stopping all methods
of delivering nuclear weapons-cruise missiles, for example.
Any defense can be directly or indirectly attacked, or it can be overcome.
A wall can be breached, torn down or circumvented. Once that happens, all the
computer simulations and wargaming will go right out the window, because the
system will break down.
We are told that Star Wars might stop ninety or ninety-five percent of
incoming warheads. But the nerve-center holding any strategic defense together-
the advanced computers-can never be realistically tested. The only true test can
be nuclear war itself, because testing individual parts of the defense will not tell
how it will function as a whole under immense stress and direct attack. The
French Maginot Line, a wonderful piece of advanced technology for its day, was
out-flanked. And, just like the Maginot Line, SDI is not being "perfectly"
designed. SDI will not protect us against cruise missiles, manned bombers, ballistic
missiles that never leave the earth's atmosphere, and "suitcase" bombs. These
weapons of mass destruction will continue to threaten civilization regardless of
SDI.
The most likely result of SDI is a greater number of Soviet offensive nuclear
weapons. Soviet leaders want to be sure that they can overwhelm or evade any
U.S. defense. Given the substantial current lag in Soviet ballistic missile defense
technology, it seems clear that the Soviet military would achieve this goal by
building up and diversifying their current strategic arsenal. We would probably
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do the same if the Soviet Union deployed their own Star Wars system.
The Affordability Myth
Another myth is that a space defense can be built "on the cheap." One
leading conservative group, the Marshall Institute, estimates total costs at $120
billion; still others give lower estimates. The reality is that our best independent
estimates put the cost at well over one trillion dollars, and perhaps over two
trillion, because any SDI system will have to be constantly maintained and
upgraded.
Now, two trillion dollars is a mind-boggling sum. The most expensive
construction project to date in the history of humanity has been the U.S. interstate
highway system, where initial construction costs totaled $123 billion over a number
of years. Two trillion dollars is approximately sixteen times the cost of the
interstate highway system. The reality is that initial SDI costs will be at least
eight times as high as the interstate highway system. The Congressional Research
Service has estimated that a Star Wars deployment beginning in the years 1997-
2000 could cost as much as 1 trillion for launch costs alone.
In fiscal year 1988 the SDI program will spend $3.9 billion. The Reagan
Administration wants more than one billion dollars additionally, for a total of
five billion dollars, for fiscal year 1989. Most experts believe a well-run basic
research effort can be had for far less money. In short, we are spending too
much on SDI research. I am deeply troubled about our nation's sense of priorities.
The current budget level for SDI research is approximately three times as much
as the federal government spends on cancer research.
And how would a space defense be financed? There are only three ways to
do it. Number one, you substantially increase taxes. Number two, you cut other
defense and our social programs substantially. Or number three, run up astro-
nomical deficits, far greater than any we have seen to date, and send the bills
to our children and grandchildren.
These are not responsible choices. Would it not be far cheaper to negotiate
arms reductions? Every missile and warhead we remove through verifiable arms
control is a missile and warhead that cannot be used against us. The cost of
sending a negotiating team to Geneva is incomparably less than the cost of
building, deploying, and maintaining a defense in space.
The Arms Control Myth
The third myth is that SDI will help bring about arms reductions. SDI
proponents argue that it is, or will become, a bargaining chip in arms talks. But
unless you cash in your bargaining chip, it provides you no negotiating leverage.
President Reagan and his followers are serious about deploying a space defense.
They have gone well beyond research. This unduly complicates our negotiations
with the Soviet Union.
I have proposed a much cheaper alternative to SDI, and a much safer one:
a ballistic missile flight test ban. It is fully verifiable. A flight test ban will
remove Soviet confidence in planning a first strike.
Think of a marksman. If he or she is somehow prevented from going down
to the range for target practice, odds are very great that that person will do
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poorly at the meet. He or she will hit something, but it will not be the bulls-
eye.
A flight test ban will have the same effect. The United States and the Soviet
Union will still deter one another-we know, after forty years of flight testing,
that we can hit the other country and destroy major cities and installations-but
neither they nor we will have the pinpoint accuracy to take out the other side's
nuclear missiles. We will both take a step back from the hair-trigger, the "use
them or lose them" problem, and the arms race will slow down as a result.
CONCLUSION
Time and again, the United States has turned to technological advances to
provide its citizens a measure of security. Each time the Soviet Union has caught
up, and each time we go back to the labs for a bigger and better solution. Paul
Warnke, President Carter's SALT II negotiator, captured the essence of the arms
race when he wrote that we have become "apes on a treadmill."
SDI will not get us off that treadmill. No technological solution, by itself,
could possibly do so. If we want to build a safer future, if we truly wish to see
nuclear weapons greatly reduced and gradually eliminated, we have no other
choice but to negotiate them away. And at the same time we will create more
understanding, and reduce fear-the ultimate cause of the arms race.
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